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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DARRIN LAMAR PELTON, 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890509-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Two issues are presented in this Petition for Rehearing: 
1. Did this Court erroneously assume 
Defendant Pelton directed the undercover agent to 
Paco, the drug dealer, in affirming Mr. Pelton's 
conviction? 
2. Did this Court erroneously uphold the 
constitutionality of the statute, which, if taken 
as applied, includes perfectly innocent behavior? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which Defendant/ 
Petitioner relies are contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Pelton was charged with arranging to distribute 
cocaine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989) (effective until July 1, 1990). 
Defendant Pelton was tried and convicted in a bench trial 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding, on 
June 13, 1989. He was sentenced to serve jail as a condition of 
probation and has since successfully completed probation. 
On appeal, this Court affirmed his conviction. State v. 
Pelton (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1990). A copy of the opinion is 
attached as an addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A complete statement of Defendant's facts is set forth in 
his opening brief. Facts pertinent to this Petition for Rehearing 
are that at the Motion to Suppress held April 27, 1989 and May 1, 
1989, Agent Acosta never testified Pelton told him a telephone call 
would have to be made at the 7-Eleven to have the cocaine brought 
there. Suppression Motion at 34. Acosta "remembered" this "fact" 
only at the trial. (T 19). 
Once at the 7-Eleven, Pelton left Acosta's car and 
approached Paco. (T 8). Pelton never directed Paco to the agent 
(T 9) and simply rode in another vehicle for his ride home. (T 20, 
33) . 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Pelton's directing of Agent Acosta to the 7-Eleven, 
allegedly to get cocaine, but where no cocaine was found, without 
any further involvement is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for arranging a drug deal. The arrangers, Lorraine 
Coates and Paco, worked independently of Pelton because Lorraine 
directed the agents first to an apartment, where Defendant, seeking 
a ride home with his friends, joined the group. Lorraine then 
traveled with the group to the 7-Eleven. 
Although Pelton got out of the car and approached Paco, 
he never directed Paco to the agents. Lorraine did. To sustain his 
conviction for arranging, the State would have to prove he had 
knowledge of a drug deal to be able to arrange the transaction. As 
evidenced by the fact that no deal took place at the 7-Eleven, he 
did not even have knowledge of the deal when he directed the agent 
there "to get cocaine." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. DEFENDANTS ACTIONS, WHICH LED THE AGENT 
ONLY TO A 7-ELEVEN WHERE NO DEAL WAS MADE AND 
WHERE. INDEPENDENT OF DEFENDANTS ACTIONS, THE 
AGENT MET THE DEALER AND ARRANGED A DEAL, DID NOT 
AMOUNT TO ARRANGING. 
As the Court properly noted, the statute in question 
proscribes knowing and intentionally agreeing, consenting, offering, 
or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. The Court 
erroneously construes Defendant Pelton's conduct as being "one link 
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in a chain of events . . . which eventually led to the sale of 
cocaine," Slip op. at 3. For links to be made into a chain, they 
must be attached to each other. The Court incorrectly perceives 
Pelton as a link because, although he may correctly be seen as a 
link to the 7-Eleven, the "chain" ends there. Paco is at the 
7-Eleven, not because Pelton directed him there, but because it has 
been prearranged by others. Pelton has nothing to do with getting 
Paco to the agent and, in fact, Lorraine makes the introduction. 
Thus, under the rationale of State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 
1987), Pelton did nothing to arrange the deal. 
The term "arrangement" connotes knowledge of a deal and 
would necessarily include some meeting of the minds. Although the 
agent testified Pelton told him to go to the 7-Eleven to get 
cocaine, Pelton obviously did not know what he was talking about 
because there was no cocaine there. Nor did Pelton say to the agent 
anything to indicate the cocaine was not there as he expected and 
they would have to try something else. 
The Court incorrectly finds Pelton was the "triggering 
mechanism" which brought Acosta and Paco together. Slip op. at 3. 
Early in the transaction, before Pelton joined the group for the 
purposes of getting a ride home, Lorraine had already arranged for 
them to meet. (T 22). Pelton, tangentially swept into the group 
because he needed a ride home, has been erroneously convicted. 
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POINT II. THE STATUTORY PROSCRIPTION CANNOT 
CONSTITUTIONALLY INCLUDE PELTON'S ACTIONS. 
Although Pelton directed Acosta "to the 7-Eleven to get 
cocaine," no cocaine was there, nor did Pelton arrange for the 
eventual meeting of Acosta and Paco. 
It would not be illegal, and in fact would be protected 
speech, for counsel to announce to any large group, "go into that 
building to get cocaine" without doing anything more unless counsel 
had knowledge the people she addressed could in fact go into the 
building and obtain cocaine. Pelton did nothing more, and as such, 
the statute, as applied to him, is overbroad. 
If the statute is found to include such conduct, then it 
is impermissibly vague because it fails to give adequate notice of 
proscribed conduct. 
If the statute does not make unlawful a substantial 
amount of constitutionally protected conduct, the Court must examine 
the facial vagueness challenge. Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982). Just as the 
ordinance which this Court struck down in Logan v. Huber. 786 P.2d 
1372 (Utah App. 1990), the statute in question fails to limit itself 
to acts which cause the undesired results. If it is upheld as 
applied, it unconstitutionally sweeps even those who are only 
peripherally involved and who fail to have knowledge or purpose or 
intent to cause the results into its net. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, it would appear the 
Court has read more into Mr. Pelton's conduct than the State 
actually proved and thereby erroneously convicted him on 
insufficient evidence. Mr. Pelton further asks this Court to 
reconsider his constitutional claim in finding the statute 
unconstitutionally vague as applied. 
Respectfully submitted this / ' day of November, 1990. 
„_TH A-/RptfMAN 
Attorney f^r A p p e l l a n t / P e t i t i o n e r 
L 
RONALD S.N FtJJINO 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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case; 
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Court in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Darrin Lamar Pelton, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890509-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 9, 1990) 
F I L E D 
„ . NQto 91990 
V 7 C 1 « * ( * * # court 
Otah C#urt * Appals 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Attorneys: Ronald S. Fujino and Elizabeth A. Bowman, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant, Darrin Lamar Pelton, appeals his conviction of 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1990), arguing that his involvement 
did not rise to the level of criminal culpability. 
FACTS 
Both parties generally agree on the facts. Albert Acosta, 
a narcotics agent, worked with a confidential informant to set 
up a drug buy through Lorraine Coates, who was to introduce 
Acosta to a drug dealer, "Paco". Subsequently, pursuant to 
instructions from another intermediary, Acosta, Chris Baker and 
the confidential informant picked up defendant. Defendant then 
told Acosta to drive to a 7-11 store where they were to make a 
phone call and then "the man would bring the cocaine to that 
location." At the store defendant and Baker got out of the car 
and spoke to a man in a telephone booth, who turned out to be 
Paco. Coates was also present. Acosta told Coates he was 
uncomfortable with defendant and Baker present, so Coates 
called Paco over and defendant and Baker left. The drug 
purchase was later consummated between Paco and Acosta at a 
different location. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at a bench 
trial, as occurred here, we will not set aside the verdict 
unless clearly erroneous, and where the result is against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or we otherwise reach a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
Arranging to Distribute 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1990)1 provides, 
"it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally 
. . . arrange to distribute a controlled . . . substance." In 
State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986), the supreme court in 
interpreting the statute that preceded the above section, 
stated that "any witting or intentional lending of aid in the 
distribution of drugs, in whatever form the aid takes, is 
proscribed by the act. In other words, any act in furtherance 
of arrang(ing) to distribute . * . a . . . controlled 
substance' constitutes a criminal offense pursuant to the 
statute." Id. at 1320-21 (emphasis in original) (quoting State 
v.Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923-24 (Utah 1979)). 
Defendant argues that it was Coates who actually called 
Paco over to the car and introduced him to Acosta, and that he 
never possessed the cocaine, never directed Acosta to the house 
where the cocaine was purchased, was not present when the 
transaction occurred, and never discussed prices or handled any 
money. Therefore, defendant argues, he cannot be considered a 
1. Prior to 1987, arranging for the distribution of a 
controlled substance, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(1986), was a separate offense from actual distribution. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986), 58-37-8(1)(c) (1986). 
In 1987, section 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), as amended, combined the 
offenses of arranging and distributing into one section. State 
v. Clark. 783 P.2d 68, 69 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
participant'in the* arrangement. He cites several cases4to 
support this position: State v. Renfro, 735 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 
1987) (defendant discussed the purchase with officers, set a 
price, and agreed to make the exchange); State v. Ontiveros, 
674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983) (court described defendants 
activities to be a classic case of arranging when defendant 
directed an undercover officer to the drug buy location, 
procured money from the officer, purchased the drugs, and 
delivered the marijuana to him); State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (defendant attempted to contact the drug 
dealer, commented on the quality of the cocaine, was present 
during the sale negotiations and warned the undercover officer 
of a tailing car). However, nothing in these cases prevents 
the inclusion of the acts of defendant within the statutory 
prohibition. 
We conclude that defendant's actions were sufficient to 
bring him within the proscription of the statute as interpreted 
by Gray and Harrison. Defendant was one link in a chain of 
events, involving six people, which eventually led to the sale 
of cocaine. There was ample evidence from which the trial 
court could properly conclude that defendant knew that he would 
be the triggering mechanism to bringing Acosta and Paco 
together when he had Acosta drive to the 7-11 store, and that 
he also knew the transaction involved the sale of cocaine. The 
fact that Paco was present at the 7-11 store negated the need 
to make the phone call to have the cocaine delivered. 
Defendant and Coates each spoke to Paco at the telephone 
booth. Paco then made contact with Acosta and subsequently 
sold him the cocaine. Defendant acted knowingly and 
intentionally, and he was instrumental in arranging the sale of 
the cocaine. 
Constitutional Application 
Defendant also asserts that the arranging statute was 
unconstitutionally applied to his case. Defendant argues that 
the supreme court in State v. Harrison, by proscribing "any 
activity," unconstitutionally broadened the application of the 
arranging statute. The language in question is as follows: 
A statute may legitimately proscribe a broad 
spectrum of conduct with a very few words, so 
long as the outer perimeters of such conduct are 
clearly defined. The statute in question 
accomplishes this by specifying that any 
activity leading to or resulting in the 
distribution . . . of a controlled substance 
must be engaged in knowingly or with intent that 
such distribution wouLd, or would be likely to 
occur. Thus, any witting or intentional lending 
of aid in the distribution of drugs, whatever 
form it takes, is proscribed by the act. 
610 P.2d at 923 (emphasis added). 
Defendant's argument is that Harrison renders the 
arranging portion of the statute unconstitutionally vague. A 
law is impermissibly vague when it "fails to give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice" that a contemplated act is 
forbidden. Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) 
(quoting United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)). 
The underlying principle is that one should not be held 
criminally responsible for conduct in cases where one could not 
understand the proscription. Id. 
In Harrison the Utah Supreme Court holds that the 
arranging statute is such that "[t]he citizen of average 
intelligence is left with no confusion as to what type of 
conduct is forbidden." 601 P.2d at 923-24. We see Harrison as 
a legitimate definition of "arrange" as used in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp, 1989). Harrison clarifies rather 
than confuses the scope of the,arranging statute. Thus, 
totally aside from the conceptual problem presented by this 
court's presuming to declare that a prior supreme court 
decision rendered a criminal statute unconstitutional, as 
defendant would have us do, we find defendant's contention to 
be without merit. 
JR€gnaf W. Garff, Jud 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory^. Orrae, Judge 
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